UNCLOS & the Law of the Sea

One of the ‘best’ aspects of having too many university degrees is the realization that you have spent a wild number of hours researching and writing numerous papers that never get seen by anyone except your professor. Now that I am a year out of my latest law degree, I finally have the mental capacity to revisit some of these papers. So, in an effort to ensure that the endless hours spent writing these papers were not wasted, I’ve decided to post the most relevant sections here (because if you have a blog, why not use it?)

Hopefully they are helpful to someone!

In the context of maritime law, UNCLOS is omnipotent. Sometimes described as “the constitution of the oceans,” UNCLOS is an international agreement that provides the fundamental aspects of the law of the sea, including “a comprehensive system of maritime zones . . . encompassing any area of sea or seabed.”[1] Moreover, almost every State in the international community is party to UNCLOS: as of 2024, UNCLOS maintains 169 States Parties.[2] Further, many provisions of UNCLOS are recognized as customary international law.[3] Consequently, for these provisions, all States are required to follow the rules outlined in UNCLOS, irrespective of whether the State is party to the Convention.[4] Likewise, the rules outlined within the Convention can only be replaced by rules of a lex specialis nature that are established through express or tacit agreements.[5] As a result, all maritime disputes must be assessed with reference to the UNCLOS regime.[6]

However, while UNCLOS is the most prominent treaty in the Law of the Sea, it is not the only relevant treaty. Prior to UNCLOS’s creation during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the international community created four treaties and one optional protocol during the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.[7] Thus, while creating UNCLOS, the drafters had in mind these prior agreements and their corresponding rights and obligations.[8] As a result, the agreements and UNCLOS interact together to create what this Note will refer to collectively as the “UNCLOS regime.”

The maritime entitlements granted to States under the UNCLOS regime depend directly on the terra firma within the State’s territory.[9] Therefore, this post will begin by explaining the types of maritime entitlements granted under the UNCLOS regime, and the specific rights States maintain through each type of entitlement. It will then clarify the physical and legal differences between the different types of terra firma. Lastly, the post will describe how baselines, which are calculated with reference to the low-water line on nearby terra firma, are used to determine the location of a States’ maritime entitlements.

Maritime Entitlements: Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone, and Continental Shelf

Depending upon a States’ mainland coastline and its terra firma, the UNCLOS regime grants the State specific maritime entitlements, which in turn grants the State a specific set of rights.[10] These include the territorial sea; the contiguous zone; the exclusive economic zone; and the continental shelf.^[11] This section addresses each type of entitlement in turn, and explains the set of rights granted through the entitlement.

The Territorial Sea

The territorial sea is the maritime area parallel to the States’ internal waters.[12] It stretches 12 nm from the State’s baselines—i.e., the low-water line of the relevant form of terra firma.[13] States do not need to claim this right; it is automatically granted based on the low-water mark indicated on large-scale charts recognized by the coastal State.[14] States maintain an extensive set of exclusive rights within the territorial sea,[15] including: fishing rights, and resource rights to exploit the seabed and subsoil; air space rights above the territorial sea; the right to freely transport goods and passengers; the right to enact regulations regarding navigation, health, customs and duties, and immigration—to which foreign ships must comply; and certain rights of arrest over ships and persons located within the territorial sea.[16] One significant carve out exists to the State’s extensive sovereign rights in the territorial sea: foreign ships maintain the right to innocent passage.[17]

The Contiguous Zone

The contiguous zone is an area of the high seas parallel to a State’s territorial sea.[18] States may claim a contiguous zone extending 12 nm from the end of the territorial sea—i.e., 24 nm from the baselines used to calculate the territorial sea.[19] However, contiguous zones are not automatic; States must explicitly claim them in order to benefit from the rights derived from this maritime entitlement.[20] In the contiguous zone, a State only has the right to “exercise the control necessary” to prevent violations of its customs, immigration, sanitary, or fiscal laws and regulations, and to punish any such violations.[21] The justification for the existence of contiguous zones, and the limitation on the rights derived from them, is that they allow a State to protect its vital national interests without needing to extend the permittable geographic limits of territorial seas.[22]

The Exclusive Economic Zone

Beginning in the 1960s, States have claimed exclusive fishery zones—now known under the UNCLOS regime as the “exclusive economic zone”[23]—far beyond the limit of their territorial seas.[24] Under modern customary international law, exclusive economic zones may extend 200 nm from the baselines used to measure the territorial sea.[25] Given the extent of these zones, approximately 90 percent of living marine resources ultimately fall within the control of a coastal State.[26] However, like contiguous zones, the right to an exclusive economic zone is not automatic; it must be claimed by the coastal State.[27]

Within this zone, States may exercise sovereign control over the living and non-living economic resources within the seabed, subsoil, and sea waters.[28] Thus, States have complete control over the fish and other marine life within the exclusive economic zone, as well as the minerals beneath the seabed and within the sea subsoil.[29] The State may also prevent pollution and control scientific research within this zone.[30] Further, if a coastal State cannot fully exploit the fish or living resources within the exclusive economic zone, the State must make arrangements to share the surplus with other States—though it can require that foreign vessels pay to fish within this zone.[31] An important carve out to a States’ sovereignty in this region, similar to the carve out for the territorial sea, is the right to innocent passage for foreign vessels and foreign aircraft, as well as the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines.[32]

The Continental Shelf

Before the mid-1940s, all States were allowed to exploit the seabed and subsoil of the high seas.[33] However, once it became possible for States to exploit oil deposits beneath the seabed, the United States—followed by various other States—declared their “exclusive right to exploit” the seabed and subsoil of all offshore seabed areas that were no more than 100 fathoms deep.[34] In 1982, this shift in the law was codified in UNCLOS Article 76(1), which provides that a continental shelf constitutes “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,” provided that the length of the continental shelf does not extend beyond 200 nm from the State’s baselines.[35]

Within this area, the coastal State controls the continental shelf, continental slope, and the continental rise.[36] Further, the State may construct installations, which may extend above the sea’s surface, to exploit the resources of these sub-marine landforms.[37] However, when an installation does extend above the sea’s surface, the installation does not constitute an “island” for the purposes of maritime delimitation.[38] Nevertheless, States are allowed to establish “safety zones” extending up to 500 meters (1640.42 feet) around the installation.[39]

Terra Firma: Islands, Rocks, and Low-Tide Elevations

Under the UNCLOS regime, a State’s claim to title over maritime areas is directly dependent on the State’s claim to terra firma—i.e., land that can generate maritime entitlements.[40] The State must maintain ownership rights over the terra firma,[41] which must be “composed of solid material, attached to the substrate, and not of loose debris.”[42] In addition to the State’s mainland, three other types of terra firma exist under the UNCLOS regime, each of which generate a distinct set of maritime entitlements: low-tide elevations, rocks, and islands.[43] This section explains each of the types of terra firma, as well as the rights each generate, in the order of most rights to least rights generated.

Islands

An island is a naturally formed area of land, permanently surrounded by and above water, that can sustain human habitation or economic life on its own.[44] Islands maintain the same status and maritime entitlements as mainland coastlines.[45] Thus, islands may extend all of a State’s maritime entitlements—i.e., territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf—beyond that which is created by the State’s mainland coastline.[46] Moreover, there is no specification on how large an island must be; even a “comparatively small island” may generate a significant maritime entitlement for a State.[47]

Rocks

There is neither a size nor a geological composition requirement for this category of terra firma.[48] A rock is any landmass which is naturally formed, above the water at high-tide, and “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life [on its] own.”[49] A State may extend its territorial sea and contiguous zone based off the rock’s location, but the existence of a rock does not affect the extent of a State’s continental shelf or exclusive economic zone.[50]

In disputes regarding whether a landmass qualifies as a rock, the determinative factor is generally whether the rock can “sustain human habitation or economic life of its own.” In determining whether a rock meets this criteria, the landmass’s historical use is considered the most reliable evidence of the feature’s capacity.^[51] A rock is unable to “sustain human habitation” when it cannot “provide for the daily subsistence and survival of a number of people for an indefinite time.”[52] Further, a rock cannot sustain an “economic life of their own” when it is unable to support “the development and regulation of material resources in the community,” without significant reliance on outside resources.[53] However, because these two criteria are separated by the word “or”, it is unclear whether these criteria are conjunctive.^[54]

Low-tide Elevations

A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed landmass that is surrounded by water and submerged under the sea at high-tide, meaning the landmass is not permanently visible.[55] The only maritime entitlement granted by a low-tide elevation is a 12-nautical mile extension of the territorial sea, effectively making the territorial sea 24 nm from the mainland coastline.[56] However, the low-tide elevation must be located within the coastal State’s existing territorial sea to generate this extension.[57]

Maritime Delimitation: The Use of Baselines

Under the UNCLOS regime, States calculate their maritime entitlements in reference to either the normal or straight baselines along the State’s terra firma, with several exceptions for abnormal coastal layouts—e.g., river deltas, bays, and gulfs.[58] Although an in-depth description of the methods used to calculate baselines is beyond the scope of this Note, this section will briefly outline the most common method for calculating maritime entitlements using baselines.[59]

Generally, baselines are calculated by identifying “fixed permanent identifiable points on the land,” which are often the geographic coordinates along the low-water line of the State’s terra firma, as marked on large scale charts officially recognized by coastal States.[60] While normal baselines are most common, States may use straight baselines when international treaties and jurisprudence recognize that the geographic points along the State’s coastline are “inherently unstable.”[61] For example, where a coastline is regressing or progressing seaward, UNCLOS Article 7 allows maritime delimitation to be based on “straight baselines”[62] even if the land point eventually ends up under water.[63] Likewise, if a lighthouse or other similar installation is built upon a low-tide elevation, the State may draw “straight baselines” from the low-tide elevation.[64] The International Court of Justice has recognized the State’s right to draw such “straight baselines” because this method of demarcating maritime entitlements complies with the principle that territorial seas must follow the general direction of the State’s coastline.[65]

Archipelagic States are one example of a type of abnormal coastal layout that is given special treatment under UNCLOS.[66] An archipelagic State “may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outmost islands to drying reefs of the archipelago,” provided it forms an “intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.”[67] However, the archipelagic State may only take advantage of this right when the ratio of the area of water to the area of land is no larger than nine to one, and the longest baseline is no greater than 125 nm long.[68]

[1] S. China Sea Arb. (Republic of the Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶ 231 (July 12, 2016); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 159 (8th ed. 2019).

[2] States Parties, Int’l Trib. L. Sea, https://www.itlos.org/en/main/the-tribunal/states-parties/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2024). One notable State missing from the list of States Parties is the United States of America, which has signed but not ratified the Convention. This means the United States is not bound, under treaty law, to comply with UNCLOS, though it is bound to apply any provisions of UNCLOS that qualify as customary international law. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Treaties, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 46-60 (2021); cf. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Position on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 81 (2021) (describing the United States’ justification for not ratifying UNCLOS).

[3] See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, International Law related to Islands 197 (2017) (analyzing whether UNCLOS Article 121 has become customary international law); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment,2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 139 (Nov. 19) (holding that UNCLOS Article 121 has become customary international law).

[4] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 158.

[5] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 159; Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, Lex specialis, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 1-10 (2015) (defining lex specialis as a general principle in conflicts of laws that grants predominance to rules of a specific nature when rules of both a general nature and specific nature could apply to a legal situation).

[6] Id. at 159.

[7] Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Territorial Sea Convention”]; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter “Continental Shelf Convention”]; Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169.

[8] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective), Oceans & L. Sea, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective (last visited Mar. 24, 2024).

[9] North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 96 (Feb. 20); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 86 (Dec. 19). See generally Murphy, supra note 3, at 97-146 (describing how States obtain sovereignty over terra firma).

[10] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 170-76.

[11] Id.

[12] Sarah Wolf, Territorial Sea, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 1 (2013). Internal waters include the saltwater areas waters inside the inner limit of the territorial sea, and the freshwater areas within the States’ landmass. States have exclusive jurisdiction over all activities in their internal waters. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 8(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, at art. 5(1); Kaare Bangert, Internal Waters, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 1 (2018).

[13] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 2-16, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (establishing “territorial sea” as a maritime entitlement and providing the limits to this entitlement). But see James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 243 (9th ed. 2019) (explaining that some States have issued explicit declarations claiming a greater area or lesser area of sea than the 12 nm granted under the UNCLOS regime). See generally Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 170-73 (explaining this history of State practice in regard to the width of the territorial sea).

[14] Malcom N. Shaw, International Law 430 (8th ed. 2017); cf. Patibandla Chandrasekhara Rao, Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 1-33 (2011) (explaining how States resolve disputes regarding the location of the territorial sea).

[15] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see also Shaw, supra note 14, at 422-23.

[16] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 167-68; see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 27-28, 30, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[17] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 17-26, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. See generally Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 168-70 (explaining the concept of innocent passage). There are no corresponding “right to innocent passage” over the territorial sea’s air space. Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 167.

[18] See generally Crawford, supra note 13, at 250-54 (providing an in-depth review of contiguous zones).

[19] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 33(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[20] Shaw, supra note 14, at 430. Most coastal States claim a contiguous zone up to its maximum limit. Crawford, supra note 13, at 251.

[21] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 33(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, at art. 24; Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 173; see also Shaw, supra note 14, at 429.

[22] Shaw, supra note 14, at 429.

[23] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55-75, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. See generally Shaw, supra note 14, at 431-34 (providing a deeper overview of exclusive economic zones).

[24] Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 53-66 (July 25). See generally Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 173-75 (explaining the history and application of exclusive economic zones).

[25] Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Award, 1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 100 (Feb. 24) (“[T]he concept of the exclusive economic zone . . . may be regarded as part of modern international law”); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Award, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 34, 39 (June 3) (accepting that the exclusive economic zone is part of customary international law and may extend for 200 miles from the basepoints used to measure the territorial sea).

[26] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 174.

[27] However, it is important to note that inaction does not abandon a State’s right to the exclusive economic zone; a State may claim this right at any time. Id. at 175.

[28] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see also Crawford, supra note 13, at 261-65.

[29] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[30] Id. at arts. 211(5)-(6), 220, 246-55.

[31] Id. at arts. 62, 69-71.

[32] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 175.

[33] Id.; see also Crawford, supra note 13, at 254-59 (explaining this history and the history of the application of continental shelf entitlements).

[34] Michael P. Scharf, The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, in Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change 107-122 (2013).

[35] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. In special circumstances, continental shelfs may extend beyond 200 nm, provided the continental margin extends beyond this length. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 189-90. See generally Shaw, supra note 14, at 434-39 (providing an extensive explanation of continental shelfs). Moreover, in special circumstances, the limits of a continental shelf may be final and binding once a State establishes them. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 186-87.

[36] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 176 (“The continental margin consists not only of the continental shelf, but also of the continental slope, a steeply sloping area beyond the continental shelf, and the continental rise, a gently sloping area between the continental shelf and the deep seabed.”).

[37] Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 77, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[38] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 11, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Murphy, supra note 3, at 62-64.

[39] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 176; Murphy, supra note 3, at 64-65; see Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case No. 2014-02, Merits, ¶¶ 202-20 (Aug. 14, 2015) (rejecting Russia’s claim to a safety zone of three nm around an oil platform); cf. Crawford, supra note 13, at 265-66 (explaining the regime that applies to special maritime “security zones”).

[40] North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 96 (Feb. 20); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 86 (Dec. 19).

[41] See Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 161 (explaining that ownership over maritime spaces requires that a State can demonstrate “territorial title to [the] land whose coast generates the relevant maritime space claim.”) This implies that the ability to claim rights over a maritime area requires a State maintain territorial rights over land that borders the coast. Id. at 162; cf. Case C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign UK v. Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, ECLI:EU:C:2018:118 ¶¶ 72-73, 78-79 (2018) (holding that an agreement between Morocco and the European Community was invalid under international law because Western Sahara was not a “coastal State” under UNCLOS).

[42] Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment,2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 37 (Nov. 19). Icebergs and other lose debris do not qualify as terra firma under this definition. Murphy, supra note 3, at 67.

[43] Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 158.

[44] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 137 (Oct. 8) (finding that a series of islands that all remained above high-tide fell under the definition of “island” for the purposes of UNCLOS); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 625, ¶ 14 (Dec. 17) (declaring that an uninhabited landmass that was above the water line, with some low-lying vegetation and trees, was an island for the purposes of UNCLOS); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at 56-58.

[45] Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40, ¶¶ 183-85 (Mar. 16).

[46] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[47] Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment,2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 176 (Nov. 19); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at 161 n.505.

[48] Crawford, supra note 13, at 248; Nicar. v. Colom., 2012 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 37-38; S. China Sea Arb. (Republic of the Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶¶ 492, 496 (July 12, 2016). But see, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3, at 78-79 (providing examples in jurisprudence where landmasses were not considered rocks because they were “too large” to classify as such under UNCLOS Article 121(3)).

[49] If the landmass is capable of either of these last criteria, then it is classified instead as an “island.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121(3), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see Murphy, supra note 3, at 79-95 (explaining the legal significance of this latter criteria’s wording—“sustaining human habitation” “or” “economic life” “of their own”—in in the law of the sea, including related jurisprudence and State practice).

[50] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121(3), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[51] Id. at ¶¶ 548-49.

[52] See, e.g., PCA Case No. 2013-19 at ¶¶ 485-92; see Steven Lee Myers, Island or Rock? Taiwan Defends Its Claim in South China Sea, N.Y. Times (May 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/world/asia/china-taiwan-island-south-sea.html.

[53] PCA Case No. 2013-19 at ¶¶ 498-503.

[54] Compare id. at ¶¶ 493-97 (requiring that islands maintain both human habitation and an economic life, otherwise they are classified as “rocks”), with Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 163-64 (“However, if under Article 121(3) ‘[those] rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’ are not entitled to relevant maritime areas, then those rocks which can sustain human habitation or (not and) economic life are entitled to those maritime areas.”).

[55] Id. at art. 13; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11; Yoshifumi Tanaka, The international Law of the Sea 65 (2d ed. 2015); Clive Ralph Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal 41-42 (2008). A State cannot increase a low-tide elevation’s status to a rock by building an artificial instillation or lighthouse, even those these would allow the landmass to be visible at high tide. Haritini Dipla & Danae Azaria, Islands, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 15-18 (2021); see also Roberto Virzo & Mario Gervasi, Lighthouses and Lightships, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 11-14 (2020).

[56] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 13, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment,2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶¶ 182-83 (Nov. 19).

[57] Crawford, supra note 13, at 249.

[58] Shaw, supra note 14, at 414, 440; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 5, 7, 9-13, 47-48, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 3-4, 7-9; 11, 13; see, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40, 49, 97 (Mar. 16); see also Crawford, supra note 13, at 267-79 (providing a basic overview of maritime delimitation).

[59] See generally Jorge Antonio Quindimil López, Maritime Delimitation, in Oxford Bibliographies (2015) (providing an extensive description of the process of maritime delimitation—e.g., the normative framework, equitable delimitation, delimitation by agreement).

[60] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6(3); Territorial Sea, supra note 7, at art. 3; Orakhelashvili, supra note 1, at 164-65. One exception to this rule occurs when a fridge reef lays along an island. In this case, the basepoint is geographic coordinate of the outer edge of the reef. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 6, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Haritini Dipla & Danae Azaria, supra note 55, at ¶¶ 19-21.

[61] Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 287 (Oct. 8).

[62] See generally Law of the Sea – Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Off. Ocean Aff. & L. Sea 1-26 (1989) (describing the difference between normal baselines and straight baselines).

[63] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 7, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[64] Id. at art. 7(4); Shaw, supra note 14, at 414; Murphy, supra note 3, at 170.

[65] Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 128-30, 133 (Dec. 11); see also Crawford, supra note 13, at 244-45 (explaining this history of “straight baselines” and their application).

[66] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 46-54, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see Shaw, supra note 14, at 420-22; see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40, ¶ 214 (Mar. 16) (“[T]he method of straight baselines is applicable only if the State has declared itself to be an archipelagic State under Part IV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea”).

[67] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 47, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[68] Id. at arts. 47(1)-(2). Multiple island States—e.g., Japan, United Kingdom, and New Zealand—do not qualify as archipelagic States because of the maximum nine-to-one land to water ratio. See generally Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Archipelagic States, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 12 (2021).

Ginger Without Borders